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Abstract
We analyze the phenomenon of collusion for the purpose of boosting the pagerank of a node
in an interlinked environment. We investigate the optimal attack pattern for a group of nodes
(attackers) attempting to improve the ranking of a specific node (the victim). We consider
attacks where the attackers can only manipulate their own outgoing links. We show that the
optimal attacks in this scenario are uncoordinated, i.e. the attackers link directly to the victim
and no one else. nodes do not link to each other. We also discuss optimal attack patterns
for a group that wants to hide itself by not pointing directly to the victim. In these disguised
attacks, the attackers link to nodes l hops away from the victim. We show that an optimal
disguised attack exists and how it can be computed. The optimal disguised attack also allows
us to find optimal link farm configurations. A link farm can be considered a special case of our
approach: the target page of the link farm is the victim and the other nodes in the link farm are
the attackers for the purpose of improving the rank of the victim. The target page can however
control its own outgoing links for the purpose of improving its own rank, which can be modeled
as an optimal disguised attack of 1-hop on itself. Our results are unique in the literature as
we show optimality not only in the pagerank score, but also in the rank based on the pagerank
score. We further validate our results with experiments on a variety of random graph models.
Keywords: link analysis, pagerank, link spam, spam farms
1 Introduction
Generally, a search for a particular topic on a particular search engine (such as Google) will output a
ranked list of relevent web pages. The prominence of a page in this listing is an important indicator
of how many people will visit the page. For a commercial web site, its prominence with respect to
product searches has important financial consequences, as does the prominence of a competitor’s
website with respect to slander about products. Prominence in rankings is prestigious, can add
credibility to a site or a concept and can be used to make political statements [16]. For example, a
series of attempts, called Google bombs, to improve the ranking of certain sites for a specific keyword
were used to give weight to a specific political point of view, e.g., making the web-biography of
the U.S. President the top hit for the term “miserable failure”1. As a result of the importance
∗A preliminary workshop version of this paper was presented at the First International Workshop on Adversar-
ial Information Retrieval on the Web (AIRWeb 05) in conjunction with the 14th International World Wide Web
Conference (WWW2005), Chiba, Japan, 10-14 May, 2005.
1The first Google bomb was with respect to the text “talentless hack”. Since then several other attacks also
succeeded in raising the ranks of web pages with respect to specific keyword(s), in some cases using as few as 25 links.
It has been argued that several factors contributed to the success of these attacks: the number and prominence of
the attacking pages; the (un)popularity of the keyword, the use of the same keyword in all links, the higher rankings
of Blogs due the frequency of their updates, etc. Some of the keywords chosen in these attacks were very rare on
the Web at the time of the attack: “French Military Victories”. However, even attacks using keywords as popular as
“Weapons of Mass Destruction” have been successful (BBC News, Sunday, 7 December, 2003).
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attached to one’s pagerank, especially one’s Google pagerank, artificial methods for boosting one’s
pagerank are an active area for discussion. Pagerank is one of the many factors that is used in
Google’s ranking algorithm [18] and a significantly high pagerank can boost the prominence of a
page considerably.
In addition to Google bombs that were oriented towards an external site, a web-retailer could
also make use of link manipulation to improve the prominence of its own web-site with respect to
a particular topic(s). Link farms are a common method for boosting pageranks [10] where a set of
dummy pages are purposefully created to improve the pagerank of a specific page. However, in a
link farm, the targeted page is controlled by the link farm as well. The link bombers or spammers
are usually some (coordinated) set of web pages which add outgoing links to their web page. Some
of these links will point to the attacked page, and contain the text they (the bombers) are trying
to associate with the attacked page. The issue we address is how these bombers should organize
their outgoing links in order to maximize the success of their link bomb in terms of pagerank score
and rank.
There has been discussion on whether a link bomb can be considered an “undesirable” attack [20]
that exploits a weakness in the pagerank-style algorithms [12, 18]. The pagerank algorithm assigns
you a pagerank by considering the number and importance (according to PageRank) of web pages
that point to you. Given that a search engine like Google currently ranks over 10 billion pages,
one would expect that a very small number of web pages should not be able to change the ranking
of a page dramatically, contrary to what has been observed. Thus, one motivation for studying
the optimal attack is to determine specific abnormal but effective attack patterns that could be
identified as artificial link bombs.
We present results on the optimal link bomb. Specifically, the attackers are a set of web pages
whose outgoing links can be manipulated, and the victim is the target web page to be bombed.
THe victim’s outgoing links cannot be manipulated. Our main result is to establish the following
theorems as a starting point for a discussion of accountability on linked structures such as the
WWW.
Theorem 1. The attack which maximizes the pagerank score of the victim is the direct individual
attack.
Theorem 2. The attack which maximizes the rank of the victim is the direct individual attack.
Rank is the order statistic defined by the pagerank, and the direct individual attack is the attack
in which every attacker points only to the victim and to no other page. In particular, in the optimal
attack, none of the attackers point to each other. Thus, the optimal attack masquerades as a set of
uncoordinated “random” nodes, all pointing to the same page. Note that both the stated theorems
are non-trivial. An attack that maximizes pagerank score of the victim is not necessarily one that
maximizes the pagerank rank, if the attack also raises some other node’s pagerank score above the
victim’s score. To our knowledge, our result is the first result in terms of rank.
We also discuss optimal “disguised” attack patterns, in which none of the attackers wish to
directly point to the victim – all paths from the attackers to the victim must be of at least some
minimum length ℓ from the victim. In this case the optimal attack is still a direct individual attack,
however now the attackers point to some other intermediate node (not the victim).
Theorem 3. There is an optimal disguised attack in which every attacker’s only link is to the same
node which is distance ℓ− 1 from the victim.
In our work, we assume that the attackers can only control their outgoing links. They may
not control the outgoing links of any other nodes (so the target page is outside the attacking set).
Here, we give the extensions and complete proofs of optimality of the original results on optimal
direct and disguised attacks, which were initially discussed in preliminary form in [1]. In disguised
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attacks, no attacker can point to the attacked node. For malicious link bombs, it is reasonable to
assume that the target is outside the attacker set. When the attackers are trying to boost one of
their own sites, however, the attackers can control the outgoing links of the target page. This is
the case in link farms. The optimal configuration in a link farm therefore follows directly from our
results: in the link farm all the attackers except the target use the direct attack to improve the
target’s rank. The target (who is now also an attacker) uses the optimal disguised attack of length
ℓ = 1, after the other attackers have made their direct attacks to boost its own rank.
While the optimal attack is always the direct individual attack, the amount by which the direct
individual attack surpasses other (more coordinated) attack patterns may depend on the nature of
the graph. We give experimental results that quantify this phenomenon for a variety of different
attack patterns. On certain random graph models of the Web, some coordinated attack patterns
are almost as good as the direct individual attack, and can hence be used in place of the direct
individual attack as a means of disguising the attack. While the effect of graph structure on the
pagerank has been investigated in the literature [17, 12], to our knowledge, these are the first results
regarding the effect of the graph structure on the effectiveness of link bombs.
Our results raise interesting questions such as how to detect and respond to link bomb attacks
(in general this problem is NP-hard, see for example [22]). Since the attackers will have no visible
associations amongst themselves, it is hard to detect and prove that they are participating in an
attack. If the optimal attack were a tree structure, there would be a small set of nodes with high
prominence that one might argue are “responsible” for the attack. The other nodes pointing to
these nodes could also be held accountable aiding and abbeting the actions of the responsible nodes.
Such accountability is not possible in an individual attack.
We proceed by first discussing the related work and giving some preliminary definitions, followed
by a preview of our result for an isolated graph, in which the only nodes are the attackers and the
victim. We then discuss general graphs, followed by some experimental results on a variety of
random graph models. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results. (We defer
some technical proofs to an appendix)
1.1 Related Work
Link spam has received significant attention recently, and most of the work goes along the lines
of quantifying the impact of different collusion strategies on pagerank [13, 2, 7, 10]. Bianchini [4]
analyzes the impact of different community structures in the optimal energy, i.e. total pagerank
value for a set of pages. Another line of research concentrates on the problem of modifying pagerank
to make it resistant to such collusion strategies [14, 23, 6]. In particular, [14] concentrates on using a
set of handpicked trusted sites to bias the pagerank computation and develops methods for selecting
seeds to be evaluated in this algorithm. Similarly, Zhang et. al. [23] develop a method for stalling
the random jump probabilities to reduce the impact of colluding web pages. Caverlee et. al. [6]
introduce the notion of domain or host level influence throttling to combat link spam. Drost and
Scheffer [9] introduce machine learning algorithms to recognize spam pages, including those with
link spam; their work considers both number of incoming and outgoing links as well as features
related to the content.
We highlight two of the works which are the most closely related to ours. The work by Gyo¨ngyi
and Garcia-Molina [13] was developed independently of ours and has a similar flavor. In particular,
they consider the case of optimal link spam structure under the assumption of constant leakage,
which is a significant limitation. Additionally, they compute the magnitude of the attacks for
various attack patterns. The limitation of the constant leakage was addressed by Du, Shi and Zhao
in [10]. In particular, they consider the possibility that the attackers can have control of other
pages in addition the link spam farm. Du, Shi and Zhao also consider disguised attacks, when
the attacking nodes must point to non-target nodes (in addition to the possibility of pointing to
target nodes). One difference between this existing work and ours, is that it is focussed on the
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pagerank bombing. We do provide results for pagerank bombing, but our main result is to show
that the same optimality of the direct attack holds for the rank, which is more difficult to analyze.
However, we do not quantify algebraically the improvement in pagerank scores for different link
farm configurations, which is shown in Du, Shi and Zhao and Gyo¨ngyi and Garcia-Molina.
Our results for optimal disguised attacks can be converted to algorithms, however these algo-
rithms require global knowledge of the graph to implement, which may be non-realistic for bounded
complexity attackers. Du, Shi and Zhao [10] also consider disguised attacks, but allow the attackers
to point to the target but in a non-obvious way; an optimal strategy chooses nodes to point to so
as to minimize the leakage in pagerank forced by the disguise. In general, computing any optimal
disguised attack should involve the knowledge of the entire graph. An interesting open question
is whether there are near-optimal disguised attacks which can be locally computed, only knowing
some bounded in and out-neighborhood of the target and similarly some bounded in-neighborhood
of the attackers.
2 Preliminaries
A search query on a set of keywords results in an ordered list of web pages W = {ωi}. Each web
page ω ∈ W contains some or all of the keywords either in its text or in the text of a link that
points from some other web page to ω. A scoring function is used to order the pages in W. The
most prominent page (page with the highest score) is given rank 1, etc.
Google [5] considers many factors in its scoring function, including: keyword frequency; relative
locations of the keywords; the position and style of the keywords. An important factor in the scoring
function is the pagerank which depends on how the web page is embedded in the entire graph of
web pages. An early paper on the Google system [5] suggests that no one factor dominates the
scoring function, however, the pagerank plays an important role. In this paper, we will concentrate
only on the pagerank factor and discuss how it can be manipulated.
The web graph is a directed graph G = (V,E) that models the World Wide Web. The vertex set
V represents the pages and documents, and the edge set E represents the links between the pages
and documents2. The edges are directed: if (v1, v2) ∈ E, then v1 contains a link to v2. In a web
graph, the in-degree indeg(v) of page v is the number of links that point to v and the out-degree
outdeg(v) is the number of links originating from v that point to other pages. A (directed) path of
length ℓ is a sequence of vertices v0, v1, . . . , vℓ with (vi−1, vi) ∈ E for i = 1, . . . , ℓ. vℓ is the terminal
node in the path, and v1, . . . , vℓ−1 are intermediate nodes. We allow parallel edges between two
vertices, but no self-loops.
The pagerank pi models the probability that node i will be visited either by randomly navigating
down links in the web graph or by randomly jumping to page i. Let α be the probability to navigate,
and 1−α the probability to jump. Then the pageranks {pj} of the nodes in a graph simultaneously
satisfy the set of linear equations3
pi = α
∑
(vj ,vi)∈E
pj
outdeg(vj)
+
1− α
N
. (1)
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1 andN = |V |.) The first term represents the probability to reach i by random navigation.
An edge may appear multiple times if there are parallel links. The second term represents the
2Note that the definition of an edge is traditionally given by hyperlinks in a web page. However, it is also possible
to count URLs in the body of a web page as links. The definition of what constitutes a link is usually application
dependent.
3 An alternative and common formulation of the pageranks in the literature is as the stationary distribution of a
suitably defined finite irreducible Markov chain with transition matrix P = (1− α)M + αU , where U is a matrix of
1’s. Many of our results could be obtained by analyzing how the stationary distribution changes under perturbations
of P . Our approach is more graph theoretic, treating the problem as a flow.
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probability to reach i by randomly jumping. Typically, α ∈ [0.85, 0.95]. The pagerank pi is larger if
vi has a large in-degree, and its incoming links are from high pagerank nodes with small out-degree.
The PageRank algorithm [18] is an iterative approach to solving these equations. The pageranks
are all initialized to p0i =
1
N
. The PageRank iteration is given by
pt+1i = α
∑
(vj ,vi)∈E
ptj
outdeg(vj)
+
1− α
N
. (2)
pti converges to the (unique) solution of (1). We assume that every page can manipulate its outgoing
links, but it cannot change its incoming links.
A link bomb, or attack occurs when a group of attackers A = {v1, . . . , vK} alter their outgoing
links so as to boost the pagerank of a victim v0 6∈ A. Before the attack, if the edge set is E, then
after the attack the edge set will be E¯ where the only edges added or removed from E are of the
form (vi, u) where 1 ≤ i ≤ K and u ∈ V , i.e., the attackers may remove and/or add outgoing
links only. After the attack, the new web graph is G¯ = (V, E¯). Let pi denote the pageranks in the
original graph G (before the attack), and p¯i the pageranks in G¯ (after the attack). The magnitude
of the attack ∆p0 = p¯0 − p0 is the amount by which the pagerank of the victim increased, and is a
measure of the success of the attack. In our analysis, we only consider the magnitude of the attack,
and assume that all other factors entering into the scoring function are unchanged.
3 The Optimal Link Bomb
In this section, we investigate how to maximize the magnitude of the attack. In particular, we show
that the effectiveness of the attack does not increase if the attackers try to coordinate the attack
in some way, by introducing links among themselves in order to increase their ranks. (Recall that,
incoming links from higher ranked pages are more beneficial to your rank.) First, we consider a
simplified case, in which the attackers and the victim are isolated from the rest of the graph. We
then consider the general case.
3.1 Isolated Graphs
We first restrict our attention to a graph whose vertex set is composed only of the attackers and
the victim, V = A ∪ v0 (i.e., N = |V | = K + 1). Assume (for simplicity) that v0 does not point to
any member of A. We first consider some examples of attacks, before giving the general result. In
all cases, all the attackers in A point to the victim v0, and what differentiates the attacks is how
the attackers are themselves organized.
Direct Individual: The only links are to v0.
Tree: The attackers form a tree. For any graph with a topological order, one can compute the
pageranks efficiently (in linear time). We will specialize to a star attack in which v2. . . . , vK
point to v1 and all attackers point to v0.
Cycle: The attackers form a cycle.
Complete: The attackers a complete graph.
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v1 v2 v3 v4
v0
v1
v0
v4
v2
v3
v1
v0
v4
v2
v3
v1
v0
v4
v2
v3
Direct Individual Tree Cycle Complete
By solving the linear system (1) for the graph resulting from each of these attacks, we obtain
Lemma 4. For the isolated graph,
p¯0(individual) = p0(1 + αK),
p¯0(star) = p0
(
1 + α2 (K(1 + α) + 1− α)
)
,
p¯0(cycle) = p0
(
1 + αK2−α
)
,
p¯0(complete) = p0
(
1 + αK
K(1−α)+α
)
,
where p0 = (1− α)/(K + 1) is the initial pagerank of v0.
Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, after some algebra, we obtain
Theorem 5. For the isolated graph,
p¯0(individual) ≥ p¯0(star) ≥ p¯0(cycle) ≥ p¯0(complete).
We will show that the direct individual attack is optimal for the isolated graph. Note that
when a node has zero outdegree, it “stunts” the flow of pagerank. This means that the sum of the
pageranks need not be 1, i.e. {pi} need not be a probability distribution. Summing (1) over i, we
get
∑
i
pi = α
∑
i
∑
(vi,vj)∈E
pj
outdeg(vj)
+ 1− α.
If outdeg(vi) > 0, vi contributes
pi
outdeg(vi)
exactly outdeg(vi) times to the summation for a total
contribution of pi. If outdeg(vi) = 0, then vi does not contribute to the summation, so we obtain
∑
i
pi = α
∑
outdeg(vi)>0
pi + 1− α,
= α
∑
i
pi + 1− α− α
∑
outdeg(vi)=0
pi.
After rearranging terms and solving for
∑
i pi, we obtain the following useful lemma.
Lemma 6.
∑
i
pi = 1−
α
1− α
∑
outdeg(vj )=0
pj.
This lemma is useful for proving the next theorem; though it is a special case of the general
result in the next section, it is illustrative and the proof gives an intuition for the general case.
Theorem 7. For an isolated graph, the individual attack uniquely maximizes p0.
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Proof. Since
∑K
i=1 pi =
∑K
i=0 pi − p0, Lemma 6, gives
K∑
i=1
pi = 1−
α
1− α
∑
outdeg(vi)=0
pi − p0,
≤ 1−
p0
1− α
,
with equality iff v0 is the only vertex with degree 0. For an arbitrary attack,
p0 = α
∑
(vi,v0)∈E
pi
outdeg(vi)
+
1− α
K + 1
,
(a)
≤ α
∑
(vi,v0)∈E
pi +
1− α
K + 1
,
(b)
≤ α
(
1−
p0
1− α
)
+
1− α
K + 1
.
Solving for p0, we obtain that
p0 ≤
(
1− α
K + 1
)
(1 + αK).
This bound is attained by the individual attack. Uniqueness follows because equality in (a) occurs
iff outdeg(vi) = 1 whenever (vi, v0) ∈ E, and equality in (b) occurs iff every edge (vi, v0) is in E.
3.2 Arbitrary Graphs
When v0, . . . , vK are embedded in a larger graph G, the direct individual attack is still optimal.
Intuitively, one can view the PageRank iteration (2) as sending a flow of pagerank down the directed
edges. The maximum flow from vi to v0 occurs when vi points directly to v0, and to no other node
– any other links divert the flow and leads to a lower magnitude attack. The following results will
make this intuition more formal. We will generally refer to nodes which are neither the attackers
nor the victim by wj , and uj will be used to refer to any node. The 1-neighborhood N1(v) of a
node v is the set of nodes to which v points. Nk(v) (k > 1) is the set of k-neighborhood nodes:
u ∈ Nk(v) iff for some w ∈ Nk−1(v), (w, u) ∈ E. Note that v could be in its own k-neighborhood
for k > 1, and N0(v) = {v}. In this section, many of the proofs are involved, and so we will sketch
the intuition and defer the technical proofs to the appendix.
Consider attacker vi, and, without loss of generality, assume it initially has no outgoing links.
Suppose now that it adds δ outgoing edges. This results in α
δ
of its rank “flowing” along each of its
edges to its neighbors (note there may be parallel links). Thus, the rank increase for a 1-neighbor
uj is given by
∆1j = α
∑
(vi,uj)∈E
pi
outdeg(vi)
,
where the superscript 1 indicates that uj is a 1-neighbor, and j is an index that enumerates the
1-neighbors. The sum is over all parallel edges that vi may have to uj . This increase in rank in turn
propagates to 2-neighbors, resulting in an increase in the rank of a 2-neighbor uk by an amount
∆2k = α
∑
(uj ,uk)∈E
s.t uj∈N1(vi)
∆1j
outdeg(uj)
.
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The sum is over all 1-neighbors pointing to uk (including parallel edges). If the newly added edges
create a path from vi to v0, then some amount of vi’s pagerank will propagate to v0. We define ∆
l
j
to be the change in the page rank of uj from flow down all paths of length l from vi to uj ,
∆lj = α
∑
(uk ,uj)∈E
s.t uk∈Nl−1(vi)
∆l−1k
outdeg(uk)
Let δ(l) be the total increase in page rank through paths of length l, δ(l) =
∑
j ∆
l
j. Since the
pagerank increase attenuates by a factor α with each edge, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 8. For ℓ ≥ 1,
δ(l) ≤ αlpi,
with equality iff δ(l − 1) = αl−1pi and for every uk ∈ Nl−1(vi), outdeg(uk) > 0.
Proof. See Section 4.1.1.
Let S be a set of nodes. A path q passes through S if some node of S is an intermediate node
of q. A set of paths P pass through S if every path in P passes through S. Let Pt be a collection
of paths that passes through S, with every path in Pt having the same terminal node t 6= vi (t is
not an intermediate node of any path in Pt). We call t a progeny of S with respect to the paths
Pt. Since every path passes through S, some prefix of every path in Pt has a terminal node in S.
For each path q ∈ Pt, let qS be a (any) prefix with terminal node in S, and let Pt(S) denote the
collection of such distinct prefixes {qS}.
The influence I(S|Pt(S)) of vi on S is the total flow of pagerank (summed over all nodes in S)
from vi to S along the paths in Pt(S) (which are (distinct) prefixes in Pt). The influence I(t|Pt)
of vi on t is the total flow of pagerank that flows to t along the paths in Pt (which pass through
S). Every path in Pt has at least one additional edge compared with its corresponding prefix that
terminates in S, so the influence that propagates to t along Pt can be at most the influence that
propagates to S along the paths in Pt(S), attenuated by a factor α. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Let Pt be a collection of paths from vi to t which passes through a set of nodes S
(t appears only as a terminal node in Pt). Let Pt(S) be a (any) collection of distinct prefixes
terminating in S. Then
I(t|Pt) ≤ αI(S|Pt(S)),
independent of which prefixes are used in the construction of Pt(S).
Proof. See Section 4.1.2.
We now consider vi’s attack on v0. Let P denote the collection of all (distinct) paths from vi to
v0 in which v0 appears only as the terminal node, i.e., v0 is not an intermediate node of any path
in P . Note that if there are cycles in the graph, then P may contain an infinite number of paths.
Let the flow of pagerank from vi to v0 down the paths in P be denoted ∆. There may be cycles
containing v0, in which case, the pagerank increase ∆ will continue to flow around these cycles,
back to v0 increasing the pagerank further, i.e., ∆ will be amplified by the cycles. Let ∆p
i
0 be vi’s
contribution to the magnitude of the attack,
∆pi0(∆) = ∆+ amp(∆),
where amp(∆) is the amplification due to the cycles that contain v0. The larger ∆, the larger will
be the amplification of ∆,
Lemma 10. ∆pi0(∆) is a monotonically increasing function of ∆.
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Proof. See Section 4.1.3.
Lemmas 8, 9 and 10 are the main tools we will need to prove our main result, namely that the
individual attack is optimal with respect to pagerank. By Lemma 10, since ∆pi0 is monotonically
increasing in ∆, ∆pi0 will be maximized when ∆ is maximized. ∆ is given by the sum of the flows
of pagerank from vi to v0 along the paths in P , therefore we only need to consider this flow.
Let ℓ be the length of the shortest path in P (there may be many such shortest paths). Consider
the set L of all distinct paths of length ℓ originating at vi. Some of these paths have terminal node
v0. We now restrict our attention to the set L
′ containing those paths in L which do not have
terminal node v0. Note that none of the paths in L
′ can have v0 as an intermediate node since the
shortest path from vi to v0 has length ℓ. Let S denote the set of terminal nodes in L
′. Partition
P into two disjoint sets, Pℓ and P>ℓ, where Pℓ contains the paths in P with length ℓ and P>ℓ
the paths with length > ℓ. Every path in P>ℓ must pass through at least one of the nodes in S,
therefore P>ℓ passes through S. Every path in P>ℓ has terminal node v0, and v0 does not appear
as an intermediate node in any of these paths. Thus, v0 is a progeny of S with respect to P>ℓ.
Every path in P>ℓ has a prefix of length ℓ with terminal node in S. Collect these distinct prefixes
into the set P>ℓ(S).
Let ∆ℓ be the contribution to ∆ due to flow along the paths in Pℓ, and ∆>ℓ the contribution
due to flow along the paths in P>ℓ. Then,
∆ = ∆ℓ +∆>ℓ,
(a)
= ∆ℓv0 + I(v0|P>ℓ),
(b)
≤ ∆ℓv0 + αI(S|P>ℓ(S)),
(c)
≤ ∆ℓv0 + I(S|P>ℓ(S)),
(d)
≤ ∆ℓv0 +
∑
s∈S
∆ℓs
(e)
≤ δ(ℓ)
(f)
≤ αℓpi
(a) follows from the definitions of ∆ℓv0 and influence; (b) follows from Lemma 9 and (c) because
α ≤ 1. (d) follows because the paths in P>ℓ(S) are all of length ℓ, so P>ℓ(S) is a subset of all the
paths of length ℓ that terminate in S; (e) follows from the definition of δ(ℓ), since S ∪ v0 ⊆ Nℓ(vi);
finally, (f) is an application of Lemma 8. Equality occurs iff S is empty, and all paths from vi
are of length ℓ, ending at v0. Certainly, the optimal value of ℓ is 1, and so we have the following
theorem4.
Theorem 11. ∆pi0 is maximized if and only if the only edge from vi is to v0. This is independent
of all the other edges in the graph, in particular independent of the edges from the other vj.
Theorem 11 directly implies the following result,
Corollary 12. The direct individual attack is optimal for maximizing the pagerank p0.
Though the direct individual attack maximizes the pagerank of v0, it is not obvious that this
also maximizes the rank of v0, which depends on the relative pageranks. Is it possible that some
other attack, though it will increase p0 less, might increase it more relative to some other node
4 An alternative proof of this theorem using the Markov chain approach can be given using a generalization of the
result in [8], where it is shown that adding the edge (i, j) can only increase the pagerank of j.
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and hence improve v0’s rank more? The answer is no, i.e. the direct direct individual attack also
maximizes the rank (as opposed to the pagerank) of the victim.
Suppose that some other attack X maximizes the rank of v0. This means that for some node
u, p¯Iv0 ≤ p¯
I
u and p¯
X
v0
> p¯Xu (I denotes the direct individual attack). We show that such a situation
can never occur, leading to the following result.
Theorem 13. The direct individual attack maximizes the rank of v0.
Proof. See Section 4.1.4.
3.3 The Optimal Disguised Attack
We now consider the situation in which the attackers wish to maximize the magnitude of their
attack on v0, but they wish to disguise the attack by not pointing directly to the victim. In such
an attack, the anchor text will not be associated to the victim, hence we assume that the victim
already has a high prominence with respect to the anchor text. The specific disguise constraint
we consider is that for every attacker, the shortest path to the victim should have length at least
ℓ ≥ 1.
Consider attacker vi. In any attack, some amount of pagerank flows from vi to v0. In any
directed graph, we define f(u; v), the forward value of vertex u with respect to vertex v, to be the
fraction of u’s pagerank that flows to v along paths with v as terminal node but not as intermediate
node. Thus, for example, f(v; v) = 1. Since the fraction of u’s rank that makes it to v can be
obtained by multiplying the fraction flowing to each neighbor with the fraction flowing from that
neighbor to v, we obtain the forward equation for the forward values f(u; v):
f(v; v) = 1,
f(u; v) =
α
outdeg(u)
∑
(u,w)∈E
f(w; v). (3)
The forward equation (3) is similar to the pagerank equation (1) and can be solved by a similar
iterative algorithm as in (2).
For every vertex u (not an attacker), we consider the edge set Eu = E ∪ (vi, u), which defines
a new directed graph in which the edge set is augmented by a single link from the attacker to u.
For this graph, we can compute the forward value fu(w; v0) of any vertex w with respect to v0. We
define the value Vi(u) of vertex u to attacker vi by
Vi(u) = fu(vi; v0).
By Lemma 10 the optimal attack is the one that maximizes the flow of pagerank to v0, which means
that vi should point to the node u satisfying the “disguise constraints” that maximizes Vi(u). There
may be many optimal attacks, but we will now show that there exists an optimal attack for vi which
consists of adding a single link to the vertex u that maximizes Vi(u), which is at distance ℓ − 1
from v0. Let d(u, v) be the length of the shortest path from u to v; if no path exists from u to v,
set d(u, v) = ∞. Let Ul(v0) be the collection of nodes which have a path of length l to v0 and no
shorter path to v0. Thus,
Ul(v0) = {u : d(u, v0) = l}.
Suppose that the disguise constraint (which we apply to all the attackers) is that the shortest path
from an attacker to v0 must have length at least ℓ. Let Uℓ−1 = Uℓ−1(v0) be the nodes with a path
of length ℓ− 1 to v0. First we show that the maximum value of Vi(u) is attained for some node in
Uℓ−1.
Lemma 14. max
u:d(u,v0)≥ℓ−1
Vi(u) = max
u∈Uℓ−1
Vi(u).
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Proof. See Section 4.2.1.
Lemma 14 implies that we only need consider nodes that are distance ℓ−1 to v0 in determining
which intermediate node to attack. Note that for each u ∈ Uℓ−1, in order to compute Vi(u), we need
to compute fu(vi, v0), which may require the computation of fu(v, v0) for all v ∈ V . By following
arguments similar to those that led to Theorem 11, we find that the optimal attack for vi is to
point only to the vertex u that maximizes Vi(u).
Theorem 15. The optimal disguised attack for a single attacker vi is a single link to the vertex u,
at distance ℓ− 1 from v0, which maximizes Vi(u).
Proof. See Section 4.2.2.
Note that the vertex that maximizes Vi(u) may not be unique, however by Lemma 14, we know
that at least one such vertex exists in Uℓ−1.
Unfortunately, the maximizing node Vi(u) need not be the same for different attackers – the
disguise constraint introduces dependencies between attackers, i.e., the optimal attack for a par-
ticular attacker may depend on what the other attackers do. In particular, it is no longer the case
that each attacker using its optimal disguised individual attack will maximize the magnitude of the
disguised attack if the group of attackers act jointly. The following example with two attackers and
ℓ = 2 illustrates the issue.
v2v1
u
v0
w
x v2v1
u
v0
w
x
(a) Optimal individual attacks. (b) Optimal joint attack.
The optimal attack for v1 is to point to u, and for v2 it is to point to w (red dotted arrows in
(a)). However, if both attackers attack, then they should both point to u. Theorem 15 applies to
attacker vi, independently of what the other attackers do. In particular, we conclude that in the
optimal joint attack, every attacker has a single link to a node in Uℓ−1. In fact, there is an optimal
attack in which every attacker links to the same node in Uℓ−1,
Theorem 16. There is an optimal joint attack in which every attacker points to the same node in
Uℓ−1.
Proof. See Section 4.2.3.
Theorem 16 ensures that an efficient algorithm to compute an optimal joint attack is to select
the best attack among all the attacks in which the attackers all link to a single node in Uℓ−1 (there
are at most O(|V |) such attacks).
4 Proofs
For our proofs, we will need some standardized notation for discussing sets of paths, and flow of
pagerank along these paths. A collection of paths P (w1w2;x1x2 · · · xk) contains all paths from w1 to
w2 which do not contain the nodes x1, . . . , xk as intermediate nodes. The fraction of w1’s pagerank
that flows to w2 along the paths in P (w1w2;x1x2 · · · xk) will be denoted ρ(w1w2;x1x2 · · · xk). Since
only positive flow flows along paths, we have the following useful lemma,
Lemma 17. If S1 ⊆ S2 are two sets of nodes, then ρ(w1w2;S1) ≥ ρ(w1w2;S2).
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Consider cycles originating at a node w and not containing w as an intermediate node. Suppose
that a fraction γ of w’s page rank flows along these cycles back to w. Since this fraction can
also flow back to w along the same cycles (attenuated by an additional γ factor), by summing the
resulting geometric series, we obtain the following useful lemma,
Lemma 18. Consider a node w and a set of nodes S with w ∈ S. Let γ = ρ(ww;S). Then,
the fraction of w’s pagerank that flows back of w through repeated use of the cycles in P (ww;S) is
1
1− γ
.
4.1 Arbitrary Graphs
4.1.1 Proof of Lemma 8
We prove the lemma by induction on l. When l = 1, if outdeg(vi) = 0 then δ(1) = 0 ≤ αpi. If
outdeg(vi) > 0, then
δ(1) =
∑
uj
α
∑
(vi,uj)∈E
pi
outdeg(vi)
,
=
αpi
outdeg(vi)
∑
uj
∑
(vi,uj)∈E
1,
(a)
= αpi.
(a) follows because
∑
uj
∑
(vi,uj)∈E
1 = outdeg(vi). Thus, δ(1) ≤ αpi. Suppose that δ(L) ≤ α
Lpi,
and consider l = L+ 1.
δ(L+ 1) =
∑
uj∈NL+1(vi)
∆L+1j ,
=
∑
uj
α
∑
(uk,uj)∈E
s.t. uk∈NL(vi)
∆Lk
outdeg(uk)
,
= α
∑
uk∈NL(vi)
s.t. outdeg(uk)>0
∆Lk
outdeg(uk)
∑
uj
∑
(uk,uj)∈E
1,
(a)
= α
∑
uk∈NL(vi)
s.t. outdeg(uk)>0
∆Lk ,
(b)
≤ α
∑
uk∈NL(vi)
∆Lk ,
(c)
= αδ(L),
(d)
≤ αL+1pi.
(a) follows because
∑
uj
∑
(uk ,uj)∈E
1 = outdeg(uk). Equality in (b) occurs only if all nodes uk ∈
NL(vi) have outdeg(uk) > 0. (c) follows from the definition of δ(L), and (d) from the induction
hypothesis. Equality in (d) occurs only if δ(L) = αLpi. Thus the claim holds for all l > 0, which
together with the conditions for equality concludes the proof of the theorem.
Since every link in a path attenuates the pagerank flow by at least α, we have the following
lemma, which will be useful in the proof of Lemma 9.
12
Lemma 19. For any two nodes u and v, not necessarily distinct, and any set of nodes S containing
v, ρ(uv;S) ≤ αℓ, where ℓ is the length of the shortest path in P (uv;S). (Note, if u = v, then ℓ ≥ 2,
otherwise ℓ ≥ 1.)
Proof. We prove the lemma by double induction on ℓ and L, the length of the longest path in
P (uv;S). If L = ℓ, then ρ(uv;S) ≤ δ(ℓ)/pu, and by Lemma 8, we have ρ(uv;S) ≤ α
ℓ.
Assume the claim true whenever ℓ ≤ k and L ≤ K and consider ℓ ≤ k + 1, L ≤ K + 1.
ρ(uv;S) =
α
outdeg(u)
∑
(u,w)∈E
w 6∈S
ρ(wv;S),
(a)
≤
α · αk
outdeg(u)
∑
(u,w)∈E
w 6∈S
1,
≤ αk+1.
(a) follows from the induction hypothesis because the shortest path length in P (wv;S) is at most
k and the longest path length is at most L. Therefore, the claim holds for all ℓ ≥ 1 and all L ≥ ℓ.
4.1.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Consider a collection of paths Pt from vi to t where t is the terminal node for all the paths, and does
not appear as an intermediate node in any path. Let Pt(S) be the collection of distinct prefixes.
For every path q ∈ Pt, let s(q) denote the terminal node of its corresponding prefix in Pt(S). Let
S = {s1, . . . , sk}. We can partition the paths in Pt into k disjoint sets P
1
t , . . . , P
k
t according to the
terminal nodes of the prefixes, i.e., for every path q ∈ P it , s(q) = si. Let ∆si be the total (summed)
flow of pagerank to si along the paths in P
i
t .
I(S|Pt(S)) =
∑
si∈S
∆si
Each path in P it contains a suffix path from si to t in which t does not appear as an intermediate
node. Consider the fraction ρ of si’s pagerank that flows along the distinct such suffixes to t. Since
these suffixes are a subset of the paths in P (sit; t), we have that ρ ≤ ρ(sit, t). I(t|P
i
t ) can now be
bounded as follows,
I(t|P it ) = ρ∆si,
≤ ρ(sit; t)∆si .
I(t|Pt) is the sum of the I(t|P
i
t )’s, so we obtain
I(t|Pt) =
k∑
i=1
I(t|P it ),
≤
k∑
i=1
ρ(sit; t)∆si ,
(a)
≤ α
k∑
i=1
∆si ,
= αI(S|Pt(S)),
where (a) follows from Lemma 19.
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4.1.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Partition the set of cycles containing v0 as initial and terminal node, but not as intermediate node,
into two disjoint sets C1 and C2. C1 contains the cycles which do not contain vi and C2 contains
all the cycles which also contain vi. (Note C1 = P (v0v0; v0vi).) Let Pv0,vi = P (v0vi; v0vi) and
ρv0vi = ρ(v0vi; v0vi). (Note that ρv0vi ≤ α.) Every path in C2 is composed of a path in Pv0,vi
together with a path from vi to v0 in which v0 appears only as a terminal node (i.e. a path in
P = P (viv0; v0)). The fraction of vi’s pagerank that flows to v0 along paths in P is by definition
∆/pi. Thus, the fraction of v0’s pagerank that flows along cycles in C2 back to v0 is ρv0vi∆/pi. Let
γv0 = ρ(v0v0; v0vi) be the fraction of v0 pagerank that flows along cycles in C1 back to v0. Therefore
the total fraction of v0’s page rank that flows back to v0 along paths in C1 ∪C2 is γv0 + ρv0vi∆/pi.
This fraction will be amplified again by the cycles in C1 and C2. Thus,
∆pi0 = ∆+ amp(∆),
where amp(x) satisfies
amp(x) = φx+ amp(φx),
and φ = φ(∆) = γv0 + ρv0vi∆/pi < 1. The unique solution to this equation (which can be obtained
by expanding amp(φx) repeatedly to obtain a geometric series) is
amp(x) =
φx
1− φ
.
Substituting into the expression for ∆pi0, we obtain
∆pi0(∆) =
∆
1− γv0 − ρv0vi
∆
pi
.
To conclude, note that the right hand side is monotonically increasing in ∆.
4.1.4 Proof of Theorem 13
Consider the attack by a single attacker vi. We will show that the direct attack is best for vi
independent of the rest of the graph, in particular what the other attackers do, from which the
theorem will follow. For the direct individual attack not to maximize the rank (and some other
attack X to maximize it), there must be some vertex u for which p¯Iv0 ≤ p¯
I
u and p¯
X
v0
> p¯Xu .
First consider the case when there are no paths from v0 to u. Then, pv0 +∆p
I
v0
≤ pu+∆p
I
u and
pv0 +∆p
X
v0
> pu +∆p
X
u . Since ∆p
I
u = 0 (no paths from v0 to u),
pu − pv0 ≥ ∆p
I
v0
, pu − pv0 < ∆p
X
v0
−∆pXu ,
which is a contradiction because ∆pXv0 < ∆p
I
v0
(Theorem 11), and ∆pXu ≥ 0.
Now consider the case when there are paths from v0 to u. We introduce some definitions that
will simplify the notation:
ρv0u = ρ(v0u; viu),
ρv0vi = ρ(v0vi; v0vi),
ρuvi = ρ(u, vi; viu),
γv0 = ρ(v0v0; v0vi),
γu = ρ(u, u; viu).
(γv0 , ρv0vi are defined as in the proof of Lemma 10.) γv0 and γu are fractions that flow along cycles.
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Let ∆v0 and ∆u be the pagerank flow from vi to v0 and u along the respective paths P (vi, v0; v0)
and P (vi, u;u). Then,
p¯Iv0 = pv0 +∆p
I
v0
(∆Iv0), p¯
I
u = pu +∆p
I
u(∆
I
u),
p¯Xv0 = pv0 +∆p
X
v0
(∆Xv0), p¯
X
u = pu +∆p
X
u (∆
X
u ).
(I denotes the direct individual attack and X the other attack.) In the direct attack I, the only
paths from vi to u are through v0. In the attack X, there may be paths from vi to u that do not
pass through v0. Therefore, we have
∆Iu = ρv0u∆
I
v0
, ∆Xu ≥ ρv0u∆
X
v0
.
As in the proof of Lemma 10, let
G(x; γ, ρ) =
x
1− γ − ρ x
pvi
.
Then,
∆pIv0(∆
I
v0
) = G(∆Iv0 ; γv0 , ρv0vi),
∆pXv0(∆
X
v0
) = G(∆Xv0 ; γv0 , ρv0vi),
and,
∆pIu(∆
I
u) = G(∆
I
u; γu, ρuvi),
= G(ρv0u∆
I
v0
; γu, ρuvi),
= ρv0uG(∆
I
v0
; γu, ρv0uρuvi),
∆pXu (∆
X
u ) = G(∆
X
u ; γu, ρuvi),
(a)
≥ G(ρv0u∆
X
v0
; γu, ρuvi),
= ρv0uG(∆
X
v0
; γu, ρv0uρuvi).
(a) follows because G is monotonic in x, and we have used the identity G(λx; γ, ρ) = λG(x; γ, λρ).
u is such that p¯Iu − p¯
I
v0
≥ 0 and p¯Xu − p¯
X
v0
< 0. Thus,
pu − pv0 ≥ G(∆
I
v0
; γv0 , ρv0vi)− ρv0uG(∆
I
v0
; γu, ρv0uρuvi),
pu − pv0 < G(∆
X
v0
; γv0 , ρv0vi)− ρv0uG(∆
X
v0
; γu, ρv0uρuvi).
Combining these two equations, we find that
F (∆Xv0 ,∆
I
v0
; γv0 , ρv0vi) > ρv0uF (∆
X
v0
,∆Iv0 ; γu, ρv0uρuvi),
where
F (x1, x2; γ, ρ) = G(x1; γ, ρ)−G(x2; γ, ρ),
=
(x1 − x2)(1− γ)
(1− γ − ρ x1
pvi
)(1 − γ − ρ x2
pvi
)
Since ∆Xv0 < ∆
I
v0
(Theorem 11), we obtain
ρv0uF (∆
X
v0
,∆Iv0 ; γu, ρv0uρuvi)
∆Xv0 −∆
I
v0
>
F (∆Xv0 ,∆
I
v0
; γv0 , ρv0vi)
∆Xv0 −∆
I
v0
Let ρ00 = ρ(v0v0; v0viu), and let ρuu = ρ(uu; v0viu). Let Q = (1− ρ00)(1 − ρuu). We will need the
following lemmas to complete the proof. We will prove the lemmas after the proof of the theorem.
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Lemma 20. 1− γv0 = Q · (1− γu).
Lemma 21. ρv0vi ≥ Qρv0uρuvi.
By Lemma 21 and the monotonicity of F with respect to ρ, we have
ρv0uF (∆
X
v0
,∆Iv0 ; γu, ρv0uρuvi)
∆Xv0 −∆
I
v0
>
F (∆Xv0 ,∆
I
v0
; γv0 , Qρv0uρuvi)
∆Xv0 −∆
I
v0
or that,
ρv0u(1− γu)
(1− γu − ρv0uρuvi
∆Xv0
pvi
)(1− γu − ρv0uρuvi
∆Iv0
pvi
)
>
(1− γv0)
(1− γv0 −Qρv0uρuvi
∆Xv0
pvi
)(1− γv0 −Qρv0uρuvi
∆Iv0
pvi
)
,
(a)
=
Q(1− γu)
Q2(1− γu − ρv0uρuvi
∆Xv0
pvi
)(1− γu − ρv0uρuvi
∆Iv0
pvi
)
,
where (a) follows using Lemma 20. After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
Qρv0u =
1− ρ00
1− ρuu
ρv0u > 1.
In any attack, v0’s pagerank flows to u with attenuation ρ(v0u; v0u) amplified by 1/(1− ρ(uu; v0)).
Since pu’s pagerank cannot be smaller that what flows from v0, we have
pu ≥
ρ(v0u; v0u)
1− ρ(uu; v0)
pv0 ,
(a)
≥
ρ(v0u; v0viu)
1− ρ(uu; v0viu)
pv0 ,
(b)
=
(1− ρ(v0v0; v0viu))ρ(v0u; viu)
1− ρ(uu; v0viu)
pv0 ,
(c)
=
(1− ρ00)ρv0u
1− ρuu
pv0 ,
> pv0 .
(a) follows from Lemma 17; (b) follows because using Lemma 18,
ρ(v0u; viu) =
ρ(v0u; v0viu)
1− ρ(v0v0; v0viu)
;
and, (c) follows from the definitions of ρ00, ρuu, ρv0u. Thus, pu > pv0 for any attack, in particular,
for the attack X, which contradicts the fact that p¯Xv0 > p¯
X
u . This contradiction implies that no such
vertex u can exist, which concludes the proof of the theorem.
4.1.5 Proof of Lemma 20
We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 13. Let S = {v0, vi, u}. γ0 = ρ(v0v0; v0vi) is
the fraction of v0’s rank flow back to v0 along paths in P (v0v0; v0vi). The paths in P (v0v0; v0vi)
can be partitioned into paths that contain u and paths that do not. The paths that contain u
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are paths in P (v0u;S) concatenated with paths in P (uu;S) concatenated with paths in P (uv0;S).
Therefore, using Lemma 18,
γ0 = ρ(v0v0;S) +
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uv0;S)
1− ρ(uu;S)
.
Applying similar reasoning to γu, and using the definitions for ρ00, ρuu, we obtain
γ0 = ρ00 +
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uv0;S)
1− ρuu
,
γu = ρuu +
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uv0;S)
1− ρ00
.
Let A = ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uv0;S). We find that
1− γ0 =
(1− ρ00)(1− ρuu)−A
1− ρuu
,
1− γu =
(1− ρ00)(1− ρuu)−A
1− ρ00
,
It now follows that (1− γ0) = Q(1− γu).
4.1.6 Proof of Lemma 21
We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 13. Let S = {v0, vi, u}. Then,
ρv0vi = ρ(v0vi;S) +
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uvi;S)
1− ρuu
,
ρv0u =
ρ(v0u;S)
1− ρ00
,
ρuvi = ρ(uvi;S) +
ρ(uv0;S)ρ(v0vi;S)
1− ρ00
.
Therefore, we find that
Qρv0uρuvi =
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uvi;S)
1− ρuu
+
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uv0;S)ρ(v0vi;S)
(1− ρuu)(1− ρ00)
,
= ρv0vi − ρ(v0vi;S) +
ρ(v0u;S)ρ(uv0;S)ρ(v0vi;S)
(1− ρuu)(1− ρ00)
.
After rearranging terms, we obtain
ρv0vi −Qρv0uρuvi = ρ(v0vi;S) ·
(
1−
ρ(v0u;S)
1− ρuu
·
ρ(uv0;S)
1− ρ00
)
,
(a)
= ρ(v0vi;S) · (1− ρ(v0u; viu)ρ(uv0; v0vi)) .
(a) follows from Lemma 18. To conclude, note that ρ(v0u; viu)ρ(uv0; v0vi) ≤ α
2 (Lemma 19), and
so the right hand side is ≥ 0.
4.2 The Optimal Disguised Attack
For the optimal disguised attack, every path from an attacker to the victim must have length ≥ ℓ.
We only consider the case that such attacks are possible, in particular, Uℓ−1 is not empty.
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Consider the graph with the edge set Eu = E∪(vi, u). Let Pu(vw;x1, . . . , xk) and ρu(vw;x1, . . . , xk)
be defined with respect to the edge set Eu in exactly the same way that P (vw;x1, . . . , xk) and
ρ(vw;x1, . . . , xk) were defined in the previous section. Note that
Vi(u) = fu(vi; v0) = ρu(viv0; v0),
and more generally,
fu(v,w) = ρu(vw;w).
Let ρmax(v) be the maximum forward rank (with respect to v0) of any 1-neighbor of v,
ρmax(v) = max
(v,w)∈Eu
ρu(wv0; v0)
From the forward equation, by replacing the summand by the largest term, we have,
Lemma 22. ρu(vv0; v0) ≤ αρmax(v), with equality iff ρu(w1v0; v0) = ρu(w2v0; v0) for all w1, w2
such that (u,w1), (u,w2) ∈ Eu.
Lemma 23. There is at least one vertex w∗ ∈ Uℓ−1 with ρu(uv0; v0) ≤ ρu(w
∗v0; v0)
Proof. Consider ρu(uv0; v0). We can assume that ρu(uv0; v0) > 0 (i.e., d(u, v0) < ∞), and that
d(u, v0) > ℓ − 1, as otherwise there is nothing to prove. Choose w1 in the 1-neighborhood of u
such that ρu(wv0; v0) = ρmax(u). If there is more than one possibile choice for w1, select the
choice for which d(w1, v0) is minimized, breaking any further ties arbitrarily. If d(w1, v0) = ℓ − 1
then we stop, otherwise we define w2 in a similar way to w1: w2 is a vertex in N1(w1) such that
ρu(w2v0; v0) = ρmax(w1). In general, wi+1 = argmax
(wi,wi+1)∈Eu
ρu(wi+1v0; v0), breaking ties according to
distance. By Lemma 22, since α ≤ 1, for the sequence u,w1, w2, . . . ,
ρu(uv0; v0) ≤ ρu(w1v0; v0) ≤ ρu(w2v0; v0) ≤ · · · .
Further, if ρu(wiv0; v0) = ρu(wi+1v0; v0) (which can only happen if α = 1 and all neighbors have
the same ρ), then, since the ties were broken by distance, d(wi, v0) > d(wi+1, v0). Thus, there are
no repetitions in the sequence u,w1, w2, . . .. Since there is a path from u to v0 and d(u, v0) > ℓ− 1,
by the pigeon hole principle, we conclude that at least one vertex w∗ in this sequence is distance
ℓ− 1 from v0,
Note that equality in the Lemma can only occur if α = 1, thus for α < 1, it is strictly better to
be in Uℓ−1 than not. To prove Lemma 14, we will show that Vi(w
∗) ≥ Vi(u).
4.2.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Suppose that the maximum is attained for a vertex u with d(u, v0) > ℓ− 1. Let w
∗ ∈ Uℓ−1 be such
that ρu(w
∗v0; v0) ≥ ρu(uv0; v0) (Lemma 23 guarantees the existence of such a vertex). We show
that Vi(u) ≤ Vi(w
∗). From the definitions of Vi(u) and Vi(w
∗), we have that
Vi(u) = ρu(viv0; v0),
= αρu(uv0; v0),
(a)
≤ αρu(w
∗v0; v0);
Vi(w
∗) = ρw∗(viv0),
= αρw∗(w
∗v0; v0).
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(a) follows from the definition of w∗. By considering the paths which reuse vi and those which do
not, we have that
ρu(w
∗v0; v0) = ρu(w
∗v0; viv0) + ρu(w
∗vi; viv0)ρu(viv0; v0),
(a)
= ρu(w
∗v0; viv0) + αρu(w
∗vi; viv0)ρu(uv0; v0),
(b)
≤ ρu(w
∗v0; viv0) + αρu(w
∗vi; viv0)ρu(w
∗v0; v0),
(c)
= ρw∗(w
∗v0; viv0) + αρw∗(w
∗vi; viv0)ρu(w
∗v0; v0);
ρw∗(w
∗v0; v0) = ρw∗(w
∗v0; viv0) + ρw∗(w
∗vi; viv0)ρw∗(viv0; v0),
(d)
= ρw∗(w
∗v0; viv0) + αρw∗(w
∗vi; viv0)ρw∗(w
∗v0; v0).
(a) follows because the only edge from vi in Eu is (vi, u), and similarily for (d). (b) follows from
the definition of w∗. (c) follows because only difference between Eu and Ew∗ is that the edge
(vi, u) in Eu is replaced by the edge (vi, w
∗) in Ew∗ . Therefore all paths that do not include vi as
an intermediate node are identical in Eu and Ew, and so the corresponding ρ’s are equal. Since
ρw∗(w
∗v0; viv0) > 0, ρw∗(w
∗vi; viv0) < 1, solving for ρw∗(w
∗v0; v0) and ρu(w
∗v0; v0), we get
ρw∗(w
∗v0; v0) =
ρw∗(w
∗v0; viv0)
1− αρw∗(w∗vi; viv0)
,
ρu(w
∗v0; v0) ≤
ρw∗(w
∗v0; viv0)
1− αρw∗(w∗vi; viv0)
,
= ρw∗(w
∗v0; v0).
Thus, Vi(u) ≤ Vi(w
∗).
4.2.2 Proof of Theorem 15
Lets consider an arbitrary attack X in which vi has links to w1, w2, . . . , wm, where d(wj , v0) ≥ ℓ−1
for j ∈ [1,m]. Suppose that vi has kj links to wj. Let EX = E ∪ {(vi, wj)kj}
m
j=1 be the augmented
edge set, where (vi, wj)kj represents kj copies of (vi, wj). Let ρX(viv0; v0) be the fraction of vi’s
rank that flows to v0 along paths in PX(viv0; v0),
∆Xv0 = ρX(viv0; v0)pvi .
For the single attack I, vi has only one link to w
∗ ∈ Uℓ−1, where w
∗ is such that Vi(w
∗) ≥ Vi(u)
for all u such that d(u, v0) ≥ ℓ− 1.
∆Iv0 = ρw∗(viv0; v0)pvi .
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By Lemma 10, it suffices to show that ∆Iv0 ≥ ∆
X
v0
, i.e. that ρw∗(viv0; v0) ≥ ρX(viv0; v0). Let
K =
∑m
j=1 kj . Using (3),
ρX(viv0; v0) =
α
K
m∑
j=1
kjρX(wjv0; v0),
(a)
=
α
K
m∑
j=1
kj [ρX(wjv0; viv0) + ρX(wjvi; viv0)ρX(viv0; v0)] ,
(b)
=
α
K
m∑
j=1
kj
[
ρwj (wjv0; viv0) + ρwj(wjvi; viv0)ρX(viv0; v0)
]
,
(c)
=
α
K
∑m
j=1 kjρwj(wjv0; viv0)
1− α
K
∑m
j=1 kjρwj(wjvi; viv0)
,
≤
αρw¯(w¯v0; viv0)
1− αρw¯(w¯vi; viv0)
,
(d)
= ρw¯(viv0; v0),
where w¯ = argmaxwj ρwj (wjv0; viv0). (a) follows by partitioning the paths from wj to v0 into those
that use vi and those that do not; (b) follows because the paths that do not use vi are identical
in both EX and Ewj ; (c) follows after solving for ρX(viv0; v0); and (d) follows after solving for
ρwj(viv0; v0) in
ρwj (viv0; v0) = α
[
ρwj(wjv0; viv0) + ρwj (vi; viv0)ρwj (viv0; v0)
]
.
To conclude, note that by the definition of w∗, ρw∗(viv0; v0) ≥ ρw¯(viv0; v0).
4.2.3 Proof of Theorem 16
Let X be an optimal attack in which each attacker’s only link is to a node in Uℓ−1 (not necessarily
the same node for each attacker). By Theorem 15, such an optimal attack exists. Suppose that
attacker vi points to node wi ∈ Uℓ−1. Then,
ρ(viv0; v0) = αρ(wiv0; v0).
Let A = {v0, v1, . . . , vK} denote the set containing the attackers and the victim. We use the
notation ρuv = ρ(uv;A) to be the fraction of rank flowing from u to v along paths that do not
contain a node of A as an intermediate node. Let v∗ be the attacker satisfying
ρ(v∗v0; v0) ≥ ρ(viv0; v0),
where v∗ and vi are attackers, and denote the node that v
∗ points to as w∗. Then, ρ(w∗v0; v0) ≥
ρ(wiv0; v0) for all i ∈ [1,K].
We now consider the attack X¯ in which every attacker only points to w∗. We will show that for
every node v, ρ¯(vv0; v0) ≥ ρ(vv0; v0), where ρ (resp. ρ¯) is the fraction of v’s rank that propagates
to v0 under attack X (resp. X¯). First consider w
∗. We have
ρ(w∗v0; v0) = ρw∗v0 + α
K∑
i=1
ρw∗viρ(wiv0; v0),
(a)
≤ ρw∗v0 + α
K∑
i=1
ρw∗viρ(w
∗v0; v0),
(b)
≤
ρw∗v0
1− α
∑K
i=1 ρw∗vi
.
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(a) follows because ρ(wiv0; v0) ≤ ρ(w
∗v0; v0), and (b) after solving for ρ(w
∗v0; v0). Paths that do
not pass through an attacker are identical in the attack X¯ and X. Thus, ρ¯uv = ρuv and so
ρ¯(w∗v0; v0)
(a)
= ρw∗v0 + α
K∑
i=1
ρw∗vi ρ¯(w
∗v0; v0),
(b)
=
ρw∗v0
1− α
∑K
i=1 ρw∗vi
.
(a) follows because every attacker in X¯ points to w∗ and (b) after solving for ρ¯(w∗v0; v0). Thus we
conclude that ρ(w∗v0; v0) ≤ ρ¯(w
∗v0; v0). Now consider an arbitrary node v.
ρ(vv0; v0) = ρvv0 +
K∑
i=1
ρvviρ(viv0; v0),
= ρvv0 + α
K∑
i=1
ρvviρ(wiv0; v0),
(a)
≤ ρvv0 + α
K∑
i=1
ρvviρ(w
∗v0; v0),
(b)
≤ ρvv0 + α
K∑
i=1
ρvvi ρ¯(w
∗v0; v0),
= ρ¯(vv0; v0).
(a) follows by definition of w∗, and (b) because ρ(w∗v0; v0) ≤ ρ¯(w
∗v0; v0), thus the magnitude of X¯
is at least as large as the magnitude of X.
5 Experimental results
In this section, we give some preliminary experimental results that quantify the effectiveness of link
bombs in various environments. There are four main degrees of freedom we explore: the nature of
the graph, including its connectivity or edge density; the prominence (pagerank) of the attackers;
the prominence of the victim; and, the value of α.
We ran our experiments on three types of graphs: Random is an Erdo¨s-Reyni type (G(n, p))
random graph with edge probability p; BA (Baraba´si-Albert) is a preferential-attachment random
graph with 5 outgoing edges per vertex [3]; (Such graphs are known to have power-law in-degree
distributions, and since we add the vertices sequentially, there are no cycles.) MWDTA is a
modified “Winner’s don’t take all” random graph in which every node has at least one out-going
edge [19]. (Such graphs are known to model certain characteristics of the world wide web graph
such as power-law in and out-degree distributions.). The main difference between MWDTA and
BA random graphs is that in MWDTA, a larger number of nodes will have significant in-degree,
whereas in BA a few nodes have very large in-degrees. In order to make fair comparisons, we
normalize graphs from different random graph models (Random, BA or MWDTA) to have the
same expected number of edges.
First, we generate a random graph with 1,000 nodes, and randomly select 10 attackers and a
victim. We then remove outgoing edges from the attackers and perform a pagerank computation,
obtaining:
p0: the page rank of the victim;
pA: the average pagerank of the attackers;
fp(p): the pagerank distribution in the graph;
σp: the std. dev. of the pagerank distribution.
21
We only show results for two of the attacks described in Section 3.1: the optimal direct individual
attack I, and the cycle attack C (the results for other suboptimal attacks are similar). Each attack
is repeated a number of times on randomly generated graphs to increase the statistical significance
of the results. We use the following measures of success for attack X,
G(X) = Gain =
∆pX0
p0
,
G¯(X) = Normalized Gain =
∆pX0
σp
,
D(X) = Discrepancy Factor =
G(I)
G(X)
,
D¯(X) = Normalized Discrepancy = G¯(I)− G¯(X).
The pagerank distribution fp(p) generally affects the effectiveness of an attack. Figure 1 shows
pagerank distributions for the various random graphs. As can be seen, Random has a (near)
Normal distribution, compared with BA and MWDTA which have power-law type distributions
in which MWDTA appears to have a slightly fatter tail than BA.
Some detailed results on the effectiveness of the attacks are shown in Figure 2: (a) shows how
connectivity (number of edges) in Random graphs with different p affects the attack; (b) shows
different graph types; (a) and (b) show the dependence on the prominence of the attackers, and (c)
shows the dependence on the prominence of the victim; (f) shows the dependence on α. Figure 3
shows some results for the rank (as opposed to the pagerank). We give a summary of the results
below.
Higher Density: All attacks decrease in magnitude (new edges have little additional effect when
the graph is already dense).
Graph type: Prominence of attackers has (by far) the largest impact in Random graphs, as com-
pared to BA and MWDTA. (Pageranks in Random graphs are “concentrated” around the
mean, so any bias in the victim’s pagerank results in it becoming extreme. This is less so for
BA and even less so for MWDTA.).
Higher Prominence of Attackers: Stronger attack.
Higher Prominence of Victim: Attacks become less effective and D(C) decreases (diminishing
returns).
Lower α: D(C) increases (it is more costly to divert from the individual attack).
Rank: For random graphs, an attack usually results in a top ranking for the victim, which is not
usually the case for BA and MWDTA graphs.
6 Discussion
We have shown that the best attack is the direct individual attack, in particular: any organized
structure among the attackers reduces the impact of the attack; links that cycle back to attackers
in an attempt to boost their pageranks are detrimental. The discrepancy between the optimal
individual attack and suboptimal attacks can strongly depend on the graph type through the initial
pagerank distribution. Our results indicate conditions that offer resistance to rank manipulation:
dense, power-low type graphs in which victims already have high rank, attackers have low rank
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and α is small. Our analysis has been focused on increasing a page’s rank (pagerank manipulation)
in the entire graph, i.e., the victims rank is increased for every query. The underlying model is
that the query identifies a set of nodes (based on text and anchor text), which defines an induced
subgraph of the original graph. However, the nodes are ranked according to pagerank in the original
graph. This model has the feature that pageranks do not need to be recomputed for the specific
query. An alternative approach is to order the nodes with respect to the pageranks in the induced
subgraph (hence these pageranks would need to be recomputed for every query). Such a model
would mean that one attempts to boost the pagerank with respect to a specific query and not
others. Our analysis does not apply to this model, and it is no longer true that the optimal attack
is the direct individual attack. The following example (with a single attacker) illustrates:
v0
X X
X
v1
X
v0
X
X
X
v1
X
X
v0
X
X
X
v1
X
X
X
(a) Original graph. (b) Direct attack. (c) Indirect attack.
In (a) we show the original graph, where X will be the query text and the attacker wants to boost
the rank of v0 with respect to X. In (b) we show the subgraph induced by the direct attack, where
the attacker places X in its page as well as in the anchor text of the link. In the resulting induced
subgraph, the rank of v0 is not the highest. The benefit of the non-direct attack in (c) is that other
nodes that point to v0 get included into the induced subgraph. Thus while the flow of rank from
v1 to v0 is decreased, this is more than compensated for by the additional rank contribution from
the newly included nodes. A better attack would arise if v1 added another link to v0. In fact for
any attack in which v1 has k links to v0, a strictly better attack with k+1 links is possible. In this
example, there is no optimal attack. In general, we can formulate this notion by saying that the
attacker should add the minimum number of links to all nodes with paths to the victim which do
not contain the query text, and hence would not be included in the subgraph. The attackers should
then place as many parallel direct links to v0 as is feasible. The end effect is to include all nodes
with paths to the victim with a minimum diversion of page rank. Of course, such a huge attack is
not very practical, and an interesting question is to consider the optimal attack under this model
when each attacker has a fixed budget of links.
The PageRank algorithm favors attacks from groups that are not well connected, which makes it
harder to detect the attack, and accountability in such an attack formation becomes an issue: who
is responsible for the attack? Different variations of the PageRank algorithm may suffer a similar
fate if they propagate the pagerank in a similar way (for example Topic-Sensitive PageRank [15],
provided that the attacking group is considered relevent to the query). In order to avoid such a
fate (a dilemma faced by any ranking method open to manipulation by small groups), either one
must change the ranking function or somehow exclude the attacking group from the search engine’s
database. While such an approach is a reasonable way to deal with private companies attempting
to manipulate rankings based on their own views, it is not very democracy-friendly to arbitrarily
remove certain pages from a search engine.
As discussed in [12], the PageRank algorithm makes certain assumptions about the user navi-
gation patterns and the web structure that may not apply to the Web anymore. [12] considers the
effect of dangling nodes in the pagerank computation and provides methods to adjust for them.
They also point out that users will rarely (if ever) navigate to one of several billion pages uniformly
– they may not even know that these pages exist. In fact, users generally start from known sites
and navigate from there. Hence, random navigation is more likely to bring them to one of these
“anchor” sites. The HostRank algorithm [12] uses this assumption to choose a set of anchor sites,
and they show that such an approach is more resistant to attacks. Trustrank algorithm [14] uses a
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set of trusted pages to bias the random jump probability. An interesting problem would be to check
whether the selection algorithm for trusted pages can be manipulated (if it is not fully manual).
For example, pages can exhibit trustworthy behavior to gain trust and then sell this influence for
spam links. It would be interesting to study the sensitivity of the algorithm to various types of
attacks.
A related issue is that of navigation along links from a site. One is more likely to trust a link on
a highly ranked page, and one is more likely to follow a link to a highly ranked page. For example,
it might be much more probable to follow one of the links from a search engine or a news Web site
than a regular web page. The probability to navigate from a page in the PageRank algorithm is
independent of a page’s rank, and the link one selects to navigate is random. A plausible alternative
is that the probability to navigate from a page should be proportional to the page’s pagerank, and
the probability to use a particular outgoing link is proportional to the pagerank of the destination
page. Such a navigation model would lead to an equation (analogous to (1)) of the form
pi = καpi
∑
(vj ,vi)∈E
p2j∑
(vj ,vk)∈E
pk
+
1− α
N
.
More effort could be spent on how the transition probabilities generally affect the pageranks and
their manipulability. [12] discusses such issues for nodes with unknown outgoing links and [21]
uses the amount of traffic flow through the nodes to model the transition probabilities. It would
be interesting to see what the optimal attack with such ranking algorithms is. In short, objective
methods for the selection of the anchor sites or more plausible navigation models deserves closer
examination. One must also bear in mind (see for example [12]) that the computational complexity
of the algorithm is also an important practical consideration for any ranking algorithm.
Other factors, which we do not study here, might be significant to the success of an attack.
[11] argues that anchor text pointing to a page gives information ragarding the subject matter of
that page, and relationships between different pages. For example, Google may consider both the
pagerank and the frequency of keywords in links pointing to a page when computing the score of
the page. Google bombs in the past used the same keywords when pointing to the attacked page,
i.e., the bombing links were correlated in that they all had the same keywords, whereas in general,
links pointing to a website would not display such a correlation. If some linear combination of
these two factors is then used in the final score, it will favor attacks over the natural Web behavior.
If some small group of sites use a specific keyword to point to a victim, it is unlikely that this
groups’s sites are unrelated, and one could (for example) add pseudo-links among these sites, since
the expection would be that they participate in some group structure. As our results show, these
pseudo-links will reduce the magnitude of the attack. One could go so far as to say that if after the
addition of such pseudo-links in the graph, the pagerank distribution does not change significantly,
then the ranking algorithm should be more resistant to manipulation.
The analysis of the optimal attack structure provides a new tool for looking at resistance to link
manipulation. Such metrics and an understanding of optimal attack formations for other algorithms
should be fruitful directions for future work.
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